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Abstract 
This study provides an analysis of 163 operational loss events experienced by a 
variety of British firms over the period 1999-2008. Ten different hypotheses are tested 
to examine the distribution of loss severity and frequency with respect to business line, 
event type and corporate entity type. We also test hypotheses on the relation between 
loss severity and the decline in the market value of the announcing firm and whether 
or not the decline in market value is greater if the loss results from internal fraud. The 
results indicate that loss severity does not depend on firm size, that the decline in 
market value bears no stable relation to the loss amount and that they decline in 
market value relative to the loss amount is positively related to firm size.  
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1. Introduction 
Operational risk is the risk of (operational) losses resulting from the failure of people, 
processes and from external factors. The particular significance assigned to 
operational risk is motivated by the spectacular and widely publicised corporate 
collapses that surface regularly. It was not until the early 1990s (and possibly the mid-
1990s, following the collapse of Barings Bank) that the term “operational risk” was 
coined. Power (2005) attributes the emergence of this term to the publication of the 
Basel II proposals,1 but he suggests that Nick Leeson, the rogue trader who brought 
down Barings, was “the true author and unwitting inventor of operational risk, since 
most discussions of the topic refer to this case as a defining moment”.2 This should not 
be taken to imply that operational risk is limited to banks, as it covers firms of all 
types, more so than either market risk and credit risk.3 
 
Interest in operational risk can be attributed to the fact that it can be fatal. Blunden 
(2003) argues that operational risk is as likely to bring a company to its knees as a 
market collapse, although it is within management control in many cases (certainly so 
in the case of Barings). Kilavuka (2008) points out that “the impact of operational 
failure can be far reaching” and that “a firm’s long-term viability can be impaired by 
operational failures, regardless of whether the immediate losses are sustainable in the 
short term”. He further argues that the impact of operational failure may be augmented 
by (i) the disruption of services, which could lead to severe erosion of customer 
                                                 
1 Basel II introduced new provisions to deal with operational risk in banks—see for example Petersen 
and Mukuddem-Petersen (2005) for the effect of introducing Basel II on the riskiness of bank assets and 
de Mendonca et al. (2011) for the estimation of capital requirements for operational risk. 
2 Nick Leeson was not really the inventor of operational risk because the presence of operational risk 
predates Leeson. A more valid statement would be that the Nick Leeson story was a major reason for 
the growing interest in operational risk. 
3 The sinking of the Titanic and wiping out of the dinosaurs were two catastrophic operational loss 
events. The first occurred because of the failure of people, systems, processes and an external factor 
(the iceberg), whereas the second was entirely due to an external factor, the asteroid.  
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loyalty; and (ii) litigation, which could damage irrevocably a firm’s reputation and 
brand even if the legal cost can be easily supported by the firm’s resources. Atik 
(2009) suggests that reputational risk refers to both the prospect of a decline in 
goodwill and the possibility of feeling constrained to undertake certain transactions for 
the purpose of maintaining goodwill. Because of the general nature and diversity of 
operational risk, this study covers not only banks and financial institutions but rather a 
diversified set of firms falling under different corporate classifications.  
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the operational losses experienced by some 
British firms over the period 1999-2008. Empirical work is carried out to test some 
hypotheses pertaining to the relation between operational losses and firm 
characteristics such as size and leverage. We examine the possibility of 
interdependence between the frequency (number) and severity (amount) of losses 
incurred in a particular business line and the type of the underlying loss event and 
whether or not the corporate entity type does matter. The paper also covers an issue 
that has not been dealt with in previous studies—that of the relation between 
operational losses and leverage. Most related empirical studies concentrate on the 
relation between operational losses and frm size, an issue on which some empirical 
evidence is presented in this paper. 
 
Literature Review 
Empirical studies of operational risk have shown that a firm can suffer a market value 
decline in the days surrounding the announcement of a large loss that is significantly 
larger than the loss itself. One of the earliest studies dealing with this issue is that of  
Karpoff and Lott (1993) who analysed the reputational losses that firms experience 
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when they face criminal fraud charges. By using events of this sort that occurred over 
the period 1978-1987, they find that alleged or actual corporate fraud announcements 
produce statistically significant losses in the underlying firm’s market value. They 
attribute a small portion of any loss (about 5.5 per cent) to legal fees and penalties. It 
is suggested that a large portion of a loss reflects higher expected penalties for future 
fraud and the profits lost because of the committed fraud, whereas the remaining 
portion represents lost reputation. 
 
Wei (2003) conducted an empirical study of operational risk in the insurance industry 
to test several hypotheses pertaining to the effect of operational loss announcements. 
By using data from the OpVar operational loss database, he found results indicating 
that operational loss events have a significantly negative effect on the market value of 
the affected insurers and that the effect of operational losses goes beyond the firm that 
incurs them. In another study, Wei (2006) examined the impact of operational loss 
events on the market value of announcing and non-announcing U.S. financial 
institutions using data from the OpVar database. The results reveal a significantly 
negative impact of the announcement of operational losses on stock prices. He also 
found that the decline in market value significantly exceeds the operational losses 
causing them. 
 
Murphy et al. (2004) examined the market impact on firms alleged to have committed 
acts of misconduct such as antitrust violations, bribery, fraud and copyright 
infringement. Out of these types of misconduct, fraud was found to have the most 
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significant adverse effect on stock prices.4 They also found firm size to be negatively 
related to the percentage loss in the market value and that allegations of misconduct 
are accompanied by increased variability of stock returns. The influence of firm size 
on market losses is attributed to both an economy-of-scale effect and a reputational 
effect. Palmrose et al. (2004) also found market reaction to loss announcement to be 
more negative for restatements involving fraud. 
 
Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) explain the observation that a firm can suffer a 
market value decline in excess of the operational loss itself in terms of the indirect 
impact of reputational risk, because disclosure of fraudulent activity or improper 
business practices at a firm may damage the firm’s reputation. They measure 
reputational losses by examining a firm’s price reaction to the announcement of a 
major loss event, assuming that a reputational loss has occurred when the firm’s 
market value declines by more than the announced loss amount. They found that 
market values fall one-for-one with losses caused by external events, but fall by over 
twice the loss percentage in cases involving internal fraud. They contend that their 
results imply a reputational impact for losses due to internal fraud while externally-
caused losses have no reputational impact. This argument means that only internal 
fraud causes reputational loss, which is difficult to substantiate. We will come back to 
this point later. 
 
Cummins et al. (2006) assess the market value impact of operational loss 
announcements by U.S. banks and insurance companies. Their results reveal that 
market values respond negatively to operational loss announcements, with insurance 
                                                 
4 It is not clear why “fraud” and “bribery” are listed as two separate items when bribery is a kind of 
fraud. According to the BCBS classification of operational loss events, bribes and kickbacks are 
classified under internal fraud (see, for example, Moosa, 2007, p 100). 
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stocks having a stronger reaction than bank stocks. They also found a positive relation 
between losses and Tobin’s Q, suggesting that operational loss announcements have a 
more significant market impact for institutions with better growth prospects. The 
results revealed that market value losses are more severe than the announced losses, 
which—according to the Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) argument—indicates 
reputational losses were involved.  
 
An issue that has received considerable attention is the hypothesised relation between 
operational losses and firm size. This proposition is used to justify the basic indicators 
approach to the calculation of the operational risk capital charge under Basel II, where 
size is proxied by gross income.5 Murphy et al. (2004) explain the relation between 
loss severity and size in terms of economies of scale and reputational effects. 
 
Herring (2002) casts doubt on the usefulness of the basic indicators approach for the 
calculation of the capital charge as a percentage of gross income. He argues that it is 
doubtful if gross income captures even the scale of an institution’s operations 
adequately and that it has no tenuous link to the risk of an expected loss due to internal 
or external events. Pezier (2003) suggests that the connection between gross income 
(hence size) and operational risk is loose: “gross income is about the past whereas 
operational risk is about the future”. de Fontnouvelle et al. (2005) describe 
measurement based on a volume indicator as measurement in “an ad hoc manner”. 
Jobst (2007) argues that relating operational risk exposure to business volume 
amounts to an incomplete regulatory measure that engenders misleading conclusions 
about operational risk exposure and the associated capital charges.  
                                                 
5 Under the basic indicators approach of Basel II, the capital charge against operational risk is 
calculated as 15 per cent of the average gross income over the past three years. 
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McConnell (2008) is sceptical of the relation between operational losses and gross 
income (as a measure of size) by using two operational loss events: the terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Center in 2001 and the foreign exchange losses of the National 
Australia Bank (NAB) in January 2004. The severity of the losses caused by the attack 
on the World Trade Center were less than 5 per cent of the average gross income for 
the largest 15 U.S. banks. The reported losses incurred by NAB are only 3.8 per cent 
of the gross income of the big four Australian banks according to their 2005 reports. 
McConnell argues that “there would have to be something in the order of one NAB-
size event each and every quarter to consume the BIA-calculated capital for each 
major bank”. Sundmacher (2007) believes that gross income would not have reflected 
the actual risk taken in situations resulting in high-profile operational losses, such as 
Barings and the Allied Irish Bank. However, Chernobai et al. (2007) demonstrate that 
firm-specific characteristics (such as size) are highly significant in their models. 
 
Shih et al. (2000) examined the relation between losses and firm size, where size is 
proxied by revenue, assets and the number of employees. By estimating a logarithmic 
specification relating the loss amount to firm size using OpVaR data of 4700 loss 
events, they reached a number of conclusions, including the following: (i) the 
magnitude of loss is related to the size of the firm but the relation is nonlinear; (ii) size 
accounts for a very small portion of the variability in loss severity; and (iii) revenue is 
more correlated with loss size than either assets or the number of employees. They 
conclude that the weak relation between size and loss amount can be attributed to 
factors such as inherent differences in risk (based on the type of business), 
management competence (or lack thereof) and the quality of the internal control 
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environment. This sentiment is shared by Aue and Kalkbrener (2007) who refer to 
evidence based on a regression analysis of Opvantage data performed at Deutsche 
Bank, which produced “no significant relationship between the size of a bank and the 
severity of its losses”. However, Wei (2007) argues that there is indeed some 
connection between size and the severity of losses, pointing out that “a bank with $1 
trillion assets is probably more likely to have more and larger losses than a bank with 
$100 million assets”. He produces cross-sectional regression results showing a 
positive and statistically significant relation between the logarithm of losses and the 
logarithm of assets. Thus, the evidence is, at best, mixed. 
 
Moosa and Silvapulle (2011) conducted a comprehensive study of 54 operational loss 
events experienced by eight Australian banks during the period 1990-2007. Their 
results show that the announcement of operational losses has an adverse effect on the 
stock price and market value of the announcing bank and that no systematic relation is 
present between losses and bank characteristics such as size and leverage. They also 
show that while the frequency of an event of a certain type is independent of the 
underlying business line, there is an association between the loss amount and the 
business line. The decline in market value relative to the loss amount is found to be 
independent of the type of the underlying loss event.  
 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
The literature review provides a list of ten hypotheses that we test in this study. The 
hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: The severity of a loss event of a certain type is independent of the 
business line. 
Hypothesis 2: The frequency of a loss event of a certain type is independent of the 
business line. 
Hypothesis 3: The severity of a loss event of a certain type is independent of the 
corporate entity type. 
Hypothesis 4: The frequency of a loss event of a certain type is independent of the 
corporate entity type. 
Hypothesis 5: The decline in the market value of a firm resulting from the 
announcement of a loss event is not greater than the loss itself. 
Hypothesis 6: The decline in the market value of a firm relative to the loss amount is 
not greater when the loss event involves internal fraud. 
Hypothesis 7: The average loss resulting from an event involving internal fraud is not 
greater than the average loss resulting from other event types. 
Hypothesis 8: The decline in the market value of a firm depends on the size of the 
firm. 
Hypothesis 9: The decline in the market value of a firm depends on the loss amount. 
Hypothesis 10: The decline in the market value of a firm relative to the operational 
loss depends on size and leverage. 
Hypotheses 1-4 are tested to find out if the frequency and severity of events of certain 
types are greater in certain business lines or corporate entity types than in others. They 
are tested by constructing mn×  contingency tables (containing n rows and m 
columns). For hypotheses 1 and 2, the rows and columns represent event types and 
business lines, respectively. For hypotheses 3 and 4, the rows represent corporate 
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entity types whereas the columns represent event types. If ijO  is the cell falling in row 
i and column j,  then  

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Hence the total number of observations, N, is given by 
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Under the null that there is no association between rows and columns, the estimated 
value of the observation in each cell is given by 
N
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E jiij =                                                             (3) 
for ni ,.....1=  and mj ,.....1= . The test is based on the magnitudes of the actual 
observations, ijO , and the expected values of these observations, ijE . The null of no 
association is rejected if  
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χ                (4) 
Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the frequency or severity of events of a 
certain type tend to be greater in certain business lines or corporate entity type than in 
others. 
 
Testing Hypothesis 5 boils down to testing the null 0ˆ pp =  against the alternative 
0ˆ pp > , where  pˆ  is the estimated proportion of firms exhibiting a decline in market 
value that exceeds the loss amount and 0p  is a threshold. pˆ  is calculated as 
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where N is the sample size. ix ,1  takes the value of 1 if ii LV >∆  and 0 otherwise, while 
ix ,2  takes the value of 1 if ii LV <∆  and 0 otherwise. The change in market value 
(measured as the share price multiplied by the outstanding number of shares) is 
calculated as  
),....,min(),....,max( 51145 ++−−− −=∆ tttttti VVVVVVV                                    (6) 
where jtV −  is the value j days before the announcement of the loss event, tV  is value 
on the announcement day and jtV +  is value j days after the announcement day. The 
null is rejected in favour of the alternative at the 5 per cent significance level if 
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Hypothesis 6 is that the decline in market value relative to the loss amount ( )/ LV∆ is 
greater when the loss event involves internal fraud. This hypothesis is tested on the 
basis of the difference between the mean value of LV /∆  associated internal fraud and 
that resulting from other kinds of events. Define the sample means of losses associated 
with internal fraud and those associated with other loss events as 
1
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where )(IFfLi =  indicates that the loss event involves internal fraud and 
)(IFfLi ≠ indicates that the loss event does involve internal fraud. 1n  and 2n  are the 
sample sizes associated with )(IFfLi =  and )(IFfLi ≠ , respectively. They are 
calculated as 
∑
=
=
N
i
ixn
1
,11                                                             (10) 
∑
=
=
N
i
ixn
1
,212                                                             (11) 
where ix ,1  takes the value of 1 if )(IFfLi =  and 0 otherwise, while ix ,2  takes the 
value of 1 if )(IFfLi ≠  and 0 otherwise. The null hypothesis of the equality if the 
sample means, 21 µµ = , is rejected against the alternative 21 µµ >  if   
   )2(
ˆ 2121
2121 −+>
+
− nnt
nn
nnXX
σ
              (12) 
where )2( 21 −+ nnt  is the critical value of the t distribution with 221 −+ nn  degrees 
of freedom and 
   
2
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nn
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where 21s  and 
2
2s  are is the estimated sample variances. Hypothesis 7 is tested in the 
same manner, except that ii LV /∆  is replaced by iL . 
 
Hypotheses 8-10 are tested by estimating the regression equations 
iii AL 111 εβα ++=                                                                 (14) 
iii LV 222 εβα ++=∆                                                             (15) 
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where A is total assets, used as a proxy for size in preference to gross revenue or other 
measures of scale (such as the number of employees), and E is shareholders equity—
hence A/E is the leverage ratio.  
 
 
A Description of the Operational Loss Events 
Data on the operational losses endured by British firms were obtained from the Fitch 
(First) qualitative database, which contains long write-ups and useful information 
about loss events obtained from multiple sources. This database provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the circumstances under which loss events occur, but no 
supplementary data on the underlying firms are provided. The focus of qualitative 
databases is not on capturing every event that takes place but rather to examine events 
that are of greater relevance and interest to subscribers.  
 
The data sample comprises 163 loss events recorded over the period 1999-2008. 
Figure 1 shows the frequency (number) and severity (amount) of the loss events year 
by year. The highest number of events was recorded in 2007, but the most severe loss 
events happened in 2002 with a total loss of USD7.55 billion.6 Average severity was 
also highest at USD539 million in 2002. Only four loss events were recorded for 2008, 
valued at USD14.8 billion, which may sound strange because 2008 was the peak of 
the global financial crisis. At least two explanations can be put forward for this 
anomaly. First, not all loss events occurring in one year are recorded. The second 
explanation is that the losses incurred during the initial stages of the global financial 
                                                 
6 The loss amounts are expressed in U.S. dollar terms because this is how they are reported on the 
database. 
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crisis were predominantly market losses (asset write-downs) and credit losses resulting 
from default on loans (including mortgages) and deterioration of the market values of 
assets used as collateral.  
 
Table 1 and Figure 2 show the frequency and severity of the loss events classified by 
business line and event type, as suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) for the implementation of Basel II. Apart from “others”, most of 
the loss events happened in trading and sales, while the most severe events were 
associated with asset management, predominantly taking the form of clients, products 
and business practices. In terms of severity, most of the losses are classified under 
“other” because the classification mainly pertains of financial institutions, hence there 
is a large number of big events that are “unclassified”. Table 1 forms the basis of 
constructing the 77×  contingency table used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
Table 2 displays the classification of losses in terms of severity and frequency by 
event type and corporate entity type. We can see that big losses were endured by 
commercial banks, the sector that also witnessed the largest number of losses. Out of 
non-financial firms, two losses endured by telecommunication firms were worth 
USD6.3 billion. In terms of average severity, the telecommunication sector came on 
top, with publishing and media in second place and transportation in third place. Table 
2 is the basis of testing hypotheses 3 and 4 by constructing a 720×  contingency table. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of losses in terms of frequency and severity among 
broader sectors: financial, non-financial and services. In terms of frequency, the 
financial sector endured 86 per cent of the loss events. In terms of severity, the 
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financial and non-financial sectors were almost on equal footing. These figures 
actually raise an important question as to why Basel II mainly deals with a subset of 
the financial sector, banks, when non-financial firms are just as vulnerable to 
operational risk.  
 
Empirical Results 
The results of testing hypotheses 1-4 are presented in Table 3, showing test statistics, 
the associated degrees of freedom and the critical values of the test statistics. All of the 
hypotheses are rejected, implying the following: (i) operational losses of certain types 
tend to be more severe and/or more frequent in certain business lines; and (ii) they 
tend to be so in corporate entities of certain types. For example, losses resulting from 
internal fraud and from clients, products and business practices tend to be more severe 
in asset management and more frequent in asset management and in trading and sales. 
The results also mean that the incidence of operational losses is not equally distributed 
among firms with different corporate types. In terms of severity, losses resulting from 
clients, products and business practices are more severe in commercial banks but 
internal fraud is more severe in publishing and media. Also, the fact that a large 
percentage of the loss events are classified under “others” shows that the BCBS 
classification is not universal, even for financial institutions on their own. 
 
The results of testing Hypothesis 5 are described by Figure 4, which shows a plot of 
the test statistic for various values of 0p against the 5 per cent critical value. The 
results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for values of 0p  slightly over 
0.5. This means that the decline in market value as a result of the announcement of an 
operational loss is not predominantly greater than the loss itself: it may be greater or 
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smaller. This result is in contrast with the finding of Wei (2003) that the decline in 
market value significantly exceeds the operational losses causing them. It is also 
inconsistent with the proposition put forward by Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) that 
the decline in market value is equal to or greater than the announced loss, depending 
on whether or not a reputational loss is endured. It is, however, hazardous to assume 
that the difference between the decline in market value and the loss that triggers it is a 
reputational loss. Furthermore, there is no reason to suggest that in the absence of 
reputational loss, the decline in market value is equal to the announced loss. The 
severity of operational losses and the decline in market value are determined by 
independent factors, a point that we will come back to later. 
 
The results of testing hypotheses 6 and 7 are reported in Table 4. Neither of the two 
hypotheses can be rejected, implying that loss severity and the decline in market value 
relative to the loss are not greater in event involving internal fraud. This means that 
internal fraud does not cause proportionately greater losses in market value or greater 
operational losses than other events. This result is in contrast with the findings of 
Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005), Cummins et al. (2006), Karpoff and Lott (1993), 
Murphy et al. (2004), and Palmrose (2004). Since it is not an easy task to explain why 
internal fraud causes a greater loss of market value than other events, our results sound 
more plausible. 
 
Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) suggest that the market value of an announcing firm 
falls one-to-one with the announced loss except when internal fraud is the cause. In 
this case, they point out, the fall in market value is “over twice the loss”. They 
attribute the difference between the effect of internal fraud and that of other loss 
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events to the observation that reputational loss results only from internal fraud. This 
argument is not plausible because a firm may endure a loss of reputation for reasons 
other than internal fraud. For example, external fraud is as likely as internal fraud to 
cause a reputational loss. Losses resulting from external events may cause reputational 
losses if the way the event is handled is taken to imply management incompetence.7 
Losses resulting from fiduciary risk8 could cause reputational loss and so could 
computer glitches, antitrust violations, workplace safety problems, and almost any 
kind of operational loss event.9 For example, Kilavuka (2008) attributes the loss of 
reputation to disruption of services and litigation, both of which could be the product 
of operational failure. 
 
The results of testing hypotheses 8-10 are reported in Table 5. Equation (14) has a 
rather low explanatory power and an insignificant coefficient on the explanatory 
variable.10 The conclusion that can be derived from this result is that operational 
losses do not depend on size, a finding that casts doubt on the validity of the basic 
indicators approach of Basel II. This result supports the findings of most of the 
previous studies of the relation between loss severity and size. 
 
                                                 
7 During the global financial crisis, which is an external event that hit banks all over the world, 
reputational loss was evident but it varied from one bank to another and from one country to another 
(for example, Atik, 2009). Australian banks have not endured the loss of reputation endured by U.S., 
British, Icelandic and even some Swiss and German banks. In the U.S. Citigroup lost more of its 
reputation than the Bank of America, while in the U.K. the biggest losses of reputation were endured by 
the Royal Bank of Scotland and Northern Rock. Bank runs typically result from the loss of reputation, 
not necessarily because of fraud but perhaps because of illiquidity or mass default.   
8 Fiduciary risk is the risk of losses resulting from selling a product that is different from what has been 
advertised. Massive product recalls cause significant reputational losses, although no fraud is involved. 
9 In 2010, BP endured a massive reputational loss because of a fire on an offshore oil rig. When a new 
CEO was appointed in July, the first thing he promised was to “restore the shattered image of BP”. No 
fraud was involved in this case either. 
10 A logarithmic specification was also tried but the results turned out to be even worse. 
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The results of estimating equation (15) show that the decline in market value does not 
depend on the loss amount, which confirms the earlier finding derived from testing 
Hypothesis 5. This result is consistent with the findings of Moosa and Silvapulle 
(2011). However, it is not consistent with the proposition put forward by Perry and de 
Fontnouvelle (2005) that, except for internal fraud, the market value of the announcing 
firms fall “one for one” with the operational loss amount. This, however, is an 
assertion that does not market sense. The fall in market value results from declining 
stock prices as investors rush to sell the stock of the loss announcing firm. For market 
value to fall by an amount that is equal to the loss, the increase in the supply of stock 
must be such that it causes a decline in the stock price that produces a fall in market 
value equal (or approximately equal) to the announced loss. This proposition cannot 
be substantiated by intuition or rigorous theoretical reasoning, neither is it supported 
by empirical evidence. After all, the fall in market value and operational losses are not 
related by an exact formula that is derived from financial statements. Rather, they are 
related as in Equation (15).  
 
The finding that the decline in market value bears no stable relation to the loss 
amount, coupled with the earlier finding that the loss amount is not related to firm 
size, means that the decline in market value is not related to size. This finding is 
inconsistent with the result obtained by Murphy et al. (2004), which indicates a 
negative relation between the decline in market value and firm size.  In any case, one 
would expect that such a relation would be positive, as pointed out by Wei (2007). 
 
The results of estimating equation (16) show that the decline in market value relative 
to the loss amount bears a significantly positive relation to size but it is not related to 
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leverage as envisaged by Chernobai et al. (2007). The explanation of the finding of a 
positive relation with size is straightforward. Loss events involving large firms are 
more highly publicised and receive greater public scrutiny than those involving small 
firms. Hence, a large firm endures a more serious rush to sell its stocks, and 
consequently a more significant decline in market value, than a small firm. While loss 
severity is not related to size, the decline in market value relative to the loss is. While 
leverage should be a determinant of the decline in market value relative to the loss 
amount, the finding of no relation can be explained as follows. When a loss event is 
announced, investors rush to sell the stocks of the announcing firm without taking 
time to consider leverage. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of 163 major operational loss events experienced by British firms over 
the period 1999-2008 reveal the following findings: 
1. Operational losses of certain types tend to be more severe and/or more frequent in 
certain business lines and certain corporate entity types. 
2. The decline in the market value of a firm following the announcement of an 
operational loss may or may not be greater than the loss amount. 
3. Loss severity and the decline in market value relative to the loss amount are not 
necessarily greater when the loss results from internal fraud. 
4. Loss severity does not depend on the announcing firm’s size. 
5. The decline in market value does not depend on the loss amount. 
6. The decline in market value relative to the loss amount is unrelated to leverage but 
it is positively related to size. 
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These results support the findings of some previous studies but they are inconsistent 
with the findings of others. For example, our results do not show strong or 
unequivocal support for the findings of Perry and Fontnouvelle (2005), Palmroes 
(2004) and Murphy et al. (2004) that losses caused by internal fraud tend to be greater 
than those associated with other loss events. The findings of Cummins et al. (2006) 
and Wei (2003) show that the decline in market value is greater than the causing loss 
is likewise not supported strongly by our results. Our finding on the relation between 
operational losses and firm size supports the proposition put forward by Herring 
(2002), Peizier (2003) and McConnell (2008) against the basic indicators approach of 
Basel II. This finding is consistent with the results of Aue and Kalkbrener (2007) but 
inconsistent with the results of Wei (2007).  
 
The mixed bag of results produced by studies of this kind illustrate the difficulty of 
modelling operational risk and measuring its impact. A major problem is that of data 
availability and quality, implying that improvement of research on operational risk is 
constrained by the availability of high quality data. However, this strand of research 
has improved our knowledge of operational risk over a relatively short period of time. 
This study in particular provides new evidence on an issue not previously dealt with, 
which is the relation between operational losses and leverage. This issue is rather 
important and a topic that is worthy of future research. 
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Table 1: Classification of Losses by Business Line and Event Type 
 Severity (USD million) BDSF CPBP EDPM EF EPWS IF Other Total 
AM 0.0 471.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 654.6 0.0 1128.3 
CB 0.0 321.2 0.0 267.3 0.0 12.2 622.6 1223.4 
CF 0.0 83.3 0.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 585.7 670.7 
PS 0.0 165.0 0.0 20.2 0.0 1.1 0.0 186.3 
RB 29.5 485.8 160.4 72.2 0.0 16.8 127.4 892.2 
TS 0.0 321.7 15.0 0.0 3.5 63.4 636.0 1039.6 
Other 28.3 1724.4 468.4 52.7 39.1 1467.4 7149.6 10929.9 
Total 57.8 3573.0 646.1 412.4 44.2 2215.4 9121.3 16070.3 
         
Frequency (No) BDSF CPBP EDPM EF EPWS IF Other Total 
AM 0 14 3 0 0 3 0 20 
CB 0 3 0 5 0 5 3 16 
CF 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 5 
PS 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 5 
RB 1 11 2 4 1 4 1 24 
TS 0 19 3 0 1 5 1 29 
Other 2 29 7 3 9 6 8 64 
Total 3 79 16 15 12 24 14 163 
 
AM: asset management; CB: commercial banking; CF: corporate finance; PS: payment and 
settlement; RB: retail banking; TS: trading and sales; BDSF: business disruption and system 
failures; CPBP: clients, products and business practices; EDPM: execution, delivery and 
process management; EF: external fraud; EPWS: employment practices and workplace safety; 
IF: internal fraud; Other: events and business lines that do not fall under any of the BCBC 
categories. 
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Table 2: Classification of Losses by Event Type and Corporate Entity Type 
Severity (USD million) BDSF CPBP EDPM EF EPWS IF Other Total 
Aerospace  0.0 9.3 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 77.2 93.0 
Computer Hardware 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Corporate Conglomerates 0.0 35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.1 17.6 
Energy 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Food & Beverage 0.0 47.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 48.0 
Publishing & Media 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 859.3 0.0 859.3 
Retail 0.0 56.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 56.7 
Telecommunications  0.0 31.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6231.6 6263.1 
Transportation 0.0 546.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 546.3 
Utilities 28.2 0.0 37.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.3 
Commercial Banks 0.0 1231.7 199.8 385.4 11.2 740.9 1844.3 4413.3 
Investment Banks 0.0 427.7 10.1 0.0 11.9 1.4 0.0 451.0 
Mortgage Banks 0.0 397.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 397.2 
Retail Banks 29.5 61.0 1.2 11.3 0.0 1.4 0.0 104.5 
Brokerage 0.0 104.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 0.0 113.0 
Insurance Companies 0.1 478.9 250.6 9.2 18.4 2.6 953.1 1712.8 
Management Companies 0.0 177.7 0.0 0.0 2.2 600.0 0.0 779.8 
Hedge Funds 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Delivery Services 0.0 0.0 147.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 147.0 
Outsourcing  0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.7 
Total 57.8 3573.1 646.0 412.4 44.2 2215.5 9121.3 16070.3 
         
Frequency BDSF CPBP EDPM EF EPWS IF Other Total 
Aerospace  0 2 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Computer Hardware 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Corporate Conglomerates 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Energy 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Food & Beverage 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Publishing & Media 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Retail 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Telecommunications  0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Transportation 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Utilities 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Commercial Banks 0 25 5 12 5 14 5 66 
Investment Banks 0 6 3 0 2 3 0 14 
Mortgage Banks 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Retail Banks 1 6 1 1 1 1 0 11 
Brokerage 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 6 
Insurance Companies 1 14 3 1 1 1 5 26 
Management Companies 0 7 0 0 1 1 0 9 
Hedge Funds 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Delivery Services 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Outsourcing 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Total 3 79 16 15 12 24 14 163 
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Table 3: Results of Testing Hypotheses 1-4 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 
Test Statistic ( )2χ  6760.0 65.5 2996.1 156.7 
Degrees of Freedom 36 36 120 120 
5% Critical Value 51.0 51.0 146.6 146.6 
1% Critical Value 58.6 58.6 159.0 159 
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Table 4: Results of Testing Hypotheses 6-7 
 LV /∆  L 
1X  1.170 92.31 
2X  1.251 99.68 
2
1s  
41090.3 ×  111071.2 ×  
2
2s  
21095.1 ×  111055.2 ×  
1n  24 24 
2n  139 139 
t -0.15 -0.00007 
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Table 5: Results of Testing Hypotheses 8-10 
 Equation (14) Equation (15) Equation (16) 
1α  115.29 
(2.36) 
 
  
1β  -0.00006 
(-0.79) 
 
  
2α   546.62 
(5.11) 
 
 
2β   -0.09 
(-0.47) 
 
 
3α    475.55 
(0.80) 
 
3β    0.003 
(2.96) 
 
3γ    -7.77 
(-0.51) 
    
2R  0.004 0.001 0.060 
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Figure 1: Frequency and Severity of Operational Loss Events (1999-2007) 
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Figure 2: Frequency and Severity by Business Line and Event Type 
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Figure 3: Frequency and Severity by Entity Type 
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Figure 4: Test Statistics for Hypothesis 5 
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